The incorporation o f Social Capital in disaster resilience is controversial. It has been criticized because it sometimes “focuses on individual gains without regards to the broader community”
(Delgado and Delgado-Hume 2013: 54). According to Delgado and Delgado-Hume (2013:
109), Social Capital is occasionally constructed as a way o f improving people’s life without considering the influence o f social structures and the negative side o f social interactions. Thus, Cleaver (2005) contends that Social Capital is o f no use when it comes to development because it underplays the crippling impact o f inequitable social structures on the very poorest. The fact that Social Capital has shown an exclusionary element shows that it may not be a useful tool to employ when dealing with issues that affect the society even though it has got its own strength. Ganapati (2012: 78) also notes that “some networks in Social Capital are designed
exclusively for and or by women whereas others were more inclusive in terms o f their target group and membership.”
The study by Aldrich and Crook (2008) emphasised how Social Capital hindered important projects that were controversial yet perhaps necessary for speedy recovery. For example, these communities resisted trailer parks to temporarily house disaster victims. To some extent, this shows that disaster victims do not solely rely on Social Capital. The researcher concurs with Davies (2001) who suggests that the concept o f Social Capital can be criticised heavily for being gender blind. The work o f Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam did not acknowledge the fact that there are power dynamics/struggles that exist between men and women in the social structure. For example, in disasters, women and men are affected differently, yet Social Capital theorists ignored these aspects.
Broadly, Social Capital illuminates the value o f social relationships and networks to societies and individuals (Holt 2008: 20), but it is a contested concept as the three key theories o f the concept have shown much divergence in the way they conceptualised it. The study agrees with Holt (2008: 229) who is o f the view “that Putnam ’s accounts demonstrate troubling ontological tendencies as he endeavours to produce an objectivist and even universal account o f the theory” . Measuring Social Capital is very problematic. It can be measured in a number o f ways, but obtaining a single “tie measure is not possible” . This is because o f the fact that the most comprehensive definitions o f Social Capital are multi-dimensional, encompassing different levels and unit analysis. In addition, it is very difficult to measure ambiguous properties of Social Capital such as community, networks and trust and norms o f reciprocity. However, some researchers such as Knock and Keefer (1997) and Narayan and Pritchet (1997) and Temple and Johnson (1998) measure Social Capital using different processes and that means Social Capital can be measured although with some challenges. Furthermore, “Putnam ’s work has certainly had something to say about gender, but gender has only been o f interest to the extent that it might play a role in explaining the decline o f Social Capital or else in replenishing its dwindling stocks” (Gidengil and O ’Neil, 2006: 2).
Investing in Social Capital is, however, a risky venture. For example, “given that a member of the network may fail to perceive or act upon a mutual obligation, any investment may fail to yield any positive result” (Holt 2008: 232). This raises doubts about the links between Social Capital and public good. Some people may adopt a “wait and see” approach or they ju st become
lazy because they know that others are participating on their behalf. So they will benefit from there. The elderly and other more vulnerable people find it difficult to participate and invest;
this intensifies their marginalisation. In other words, Bourdieu’s approach is an important reminder that Social Capital can be exclusionary and in this case, it may not, therefore, enhance the resilience o f the community to disasters since some members o f the community will be excluded. Hence, the few will only be able to bounce back successfully.
In sociological debates, Coleman’s definition was received with some criticism as it was thought to be too broad and vague. Coleman had a horizontal understanding o f persons where he disregarded the fact that people have different positions in the social structure (class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality and ability). He ignored the existence o f vertical inequalities. Hence, feminists have also reacted against his approach. Feminists see that there are power dynamics between men and women which Coleman did not mention in his theory. He puts women under oppression as he viewed the influx o f women into labour market as associated with the decline o f Social Capital. Thus, according to Tzanakis (2013: 5), Coleman’s communitarian approach is blind to both gender related inequalities and to social changes associated with gender roles in society. According to Edwards, Franklin and Holland (2003: 9-11), Coleman’s view has a conservative overtone that disregarded structural inequalities and relations o f power that exist in the society.
Noticeably, Coleman’s perception o f Social Capital shows that Social Capital is nothing but a people’s ability to cooperate as a group or as a part o f an organisation to embark on activities that benefit members o f the group. For Coleman (1990), social structure preludes the agent who can use embedded Social Capital as a resource. Thus, he put much emphasis on the important role o f social relations as a resource that an individual cannot do without. According to Portes (1998: 5) and Quibria (2003: 4), “Coleman is faulted for failing to distinguish between resources and the ability of network members to obtain them” . They have noted that recipients and donors o f Social Capital have different motivations that cannot be fully accounted for by a rational action framework. W hen Social Capital shifts from an individual-level relationship to a feature o f a community, it becomes conceptually fuzzy.
Coleman can be blamed for failing to explain such a transition. From my own point o f view, Coleman’s Social Capital theory can be criticised for being lenient and soft in explaining how people in the community interact and actively participate for their benefit. When all individuals
are meant to benefit from the group, it means that there is a tendency o f some individuals to be free riders and not being active participants. Diffusion o f responsibility in that scenario is very possible. Some individuals do not want to participate in community activities and they wait for others to do so on their behalf, but they want to enjoy the benefits at the end o f the day.
Furthermore, Coleman’s insistence on closure as a precondition for the functionality o f Social Capital-based networks is questioned by other scholars such as Lin (1999) and Adler and Kwon (2002) who snubbed closure as a prerequisite for Social Capital. For Lin (1999), closure is required only in goal-specific pursuits o f actors. “W hen members are searching for and maintaining resources, closure is needed. However, when members are searching and obtaining resources, they require bridges with other network members and so closure is neither needed nor desired. Closure may create negative externalities” (Tzanakis 2013: 6). “Putnam argues that Social Capital and civil society [comprised o f voluntary associations] promote economic growth, but there is little theoretical or empirical support for this assertion” (De Philips 2001:
792). There are so many factors that can contribute to economic development besides Social Capital. People may work together in harmony, but if they lack adequate resources such as human, physical and economic capital, it will be very difficult for them to achieve economic development.
Social Capital particularly that o f Putnam, is criticised for being vague. Bebbington (1999:
871) notes that “ Social Capital belongs to an alarmingly long list o f terms in development that are notoriously difficult to define” . This shows that Social Capital is an elusive concept that lacks clarity. This is even noted from the way Putnam defined it. He used several definitions and according to Narayan and Pritchett (1999: 871), “ Social Capital while not all things for all people, is many things to many people.” This lack o f “clear and precise definition o f the phrase Social Capital seriously hampers the integration o f various conceptual and empirical works done on the subject” (Porder, 2011: 351). Furthermore, Putnam ’s (2000) work can be criticised for regarding Social Capital as a societal good whilst there are well documented examples of its downside. Portes (1998: 15) lists the downside o f Social Capital as the exclusion of outsiders, restriction on individual freedom and a downward levelling o f norms. Halpern (1999) suggests that organised crime or gangs involve a social network which entails shared norms but they do not constitute a societal good.
According to Tzanakis (2013: 7),“Putnam (1993a; 2000 and 2006) is mainly critiqued for his treatment o f trust as an aggregate indicator o f Social Capital and for the ways this is linked to associational participation, economic growth and democratic ethos at regional or national levels. This treatment exhibits fundamental, conceptual and methodological loopholes. From the researcher’s point o f view, trust is not a core indicator o f Social Capital but understanding.
This is because o f the fact that human behaviour is unpredictable. A person does a favour to his neighbour thinking that in future, that person will help him when there is a need. The person who is expected to return that favour when it is needed, might not want to give any assistance.
Therefore, understanding is the foundation o f Social Capital followed by trust.
Furthermore, Putnam can be criticised for being silent on conflicts between civil society and the state among people in the community. He only focused on the integrative functions of voluntary associations. According to Siisiainen (2000: 7), “Putnam only mentions in passing, that civil society is the seedbed o f social conflicts. Thus, he did not consider conflicts that exist in the social structure.”
2.8: Social Network Analysis (SNA) and its historical development in the academia