The Derude policy (1981)

In 1981, the Derude took over from the Department of Agricultural Development (Devag). Derude was responsible for the construction and management of smallholder irrigation schemes, AGRITEX for agricultural extension, while Department of Water Development was responsible for water delivery to the irrigation schemes. The separation of the management and agricultural extension was believed to have been influenced by the earlier extension officers who despised their dual roles as policemen and agricultural advisors to the irrigation farmers (Bolding, 2003).

According to Chitsiko (1988: 70) the separation of the dualism was problematic because,

co-ordination of the departments was poor and their co-operation inadequate. Staff members of the departments were confronted with the problem of divided loyalties.

Personality clashes between management and extension staff at some schemes have not helped matters either.

The result was a discord and lack of clarification on roles until July 1987 when the irrigation component of Derude was transferred to AGRITEX, effectively merging the extension and management functions into a single department (Chitsiko, 1988). Bolding also noted that between 1980 to 1997, the smallholder irrigation sub-sector was massively assisted by donors. It was difficult for government departments mandated with irrigation development to deal with these huge funding institutions and their differing funding conditions. The area under smallholder irrigation expanded, to 4,270 ha in 1983; 4,572 ha in 1990; and 9,958 ha in 1997 (Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) 1997: 9). Also notable was the growth in both influence and staff numbers of the irrigation engineering division within AGRITEX.

Another important development of this era was the adoption of neo-liberal policies in the 1990s.

This resulted in the government reducing or withdrawing its funding obligations for both the operations and maintenance of the existing irrigation schemes (Bolding, 2003). Secondly, irrigation management turnover was realised in most of the smallholder irrigation schemes towards the end of the 1990s, since the government withdrew financial obligations, whilst the majority of the donor funds were used to experiment with new forms of smallholder irrigation development and management. The political unrest and unpopular land invasions by the war veterans in the late 1990s dried up the international and bi-lateral funding who were earlier interested in irrigation development work. This left irrigation farmers with the high burden of financing the operational and maintenance costs of the smallholder irrigation schemes.

With the introduction of Derude in 1981 policy attempts aimed to introduce “a self-regulatory, self-disciplining machinery at the irrigation scheme to enhance maintenance of discipline, cropping patterns and recommended agronomic practices” (Pazvakavambwa, 1984: 423) (see Table 1.3). The policy attempt was a mixed blessing, it sometimes left the smallholder irrigation sector with “a host of contradictory, objectives, all policy aims that had been applied in the past that included the provision of food security, the generation of rural employment, the production of export crops, and relief of population pressures on the land to the ignition of a rural industrialisation process” (Bolding, 2003: 196). The policy provided room for local interpretation and prioritisation of the policy goals. Hence, many of the smallholder irrigation communities were

left with ambiguity in prioritisation since there could be an option to “maximise settlement and food security by decentralising decisions on cropping strategies to as many plot holders as possible, or alternatively maximise production by centralising management in the hands of the irrigation manager” (ibid., 196). Because of the colonial historicity the majority of smallholder irrigation farmers preferred the former as it gave them freedom to move away from the so-called restrictions of settlements and farming patterns. This kind of prioritization had repercussions for economic plot holding (see Chapter 4), influenced by the pressures of population growth and productivity per acre. In fact, in the case of Nyanyadzi irrigation scheme this caused multidimensional complexities in the scheme which are rather difficult to understand and worth critically and carefully exploring with intent to mediate an expansive learning process as done by this study.

Another ambiguity was associated with the policy’s management strategy. The policy gave much managerial power to the Irrigation managers who could “withhold three annually renewable permits to plot holders on account of lacking performance” (Bolding, 2003: 196), with this being a continuity of the disciplinary irrigation factory policy practised prior to and shortly after independence. Yet, on the other hand, “the policy proposed a gradual turn-over of operation and maintenance responsibilities to users by increasing their financial contribution and forming Irrigation Management Committees to achieve self-management” (ibid, 196). Hence, this posed more of a contradiction than a complementary system. Another important observation is the omission of the irrigators’ rights, as issues to do with ownership and user rights of irrigation infrastructure after hand-over were not clarified. Additionally, there were no time frames provided as to when and how the irrigation scheme qualified for turnover. Meinzen-Dick (1993: 35) argues that, “despite the fact that the Derude policy was never endorsed as official policy, it is considered the most definitive statement of smallholder irrigation policy in Zimbabwe”. As later witnessed in inter-departmental conflicts over the implementation of the policy, the top level Derude staff insisted that the IMC approach was necessary. As top level staff under the Derude they insisted on the relevance and importance of the IMC approach to management of the smallholder irrigation schemes because they perceived that the plot holders were no longer prepared to co-operate with the old-style Irrigation Managers.

Such a stance was motivated by the “widespread defiance of irrigation rules and non-payment of water rates in the schemes during the first years after independence” (Bolding, 2003: 196). Hence, the idea was to strengthen the IMCs as a strategy to avoid strict government supervision and continued subsidies on operation and maintenance. In essence, to move into self-governance and self-sustaining systems where the government was less involved. However, the Devag and AGRITEX staff interpreted the policy “as a continuation of the colonial management style, whereby IMCs were used to enforce discipline amongst the plot holders, thus ensuring sustained productivity of the schemes” (ibid., 197). Interestingly, the latter view succeeded when the AGRITEX replaced Derude as the managing agency for smallholder irrigation in 1987. Notably, the director and deputy director of Derude who were pushing for the IMC approach to management of the smallholder irrigation schemes became the directors in AGRITEX in 1985 and 1988, respectively. Hence the subsequent take-over of smallholder irrigation schemes by AGRITEX in 1987 (ibid., 2003). The Derude IMC policy which was a source of ambiguity is described in Table 1.3:

Table 1.3: The Derude Policy

According to the assistant director Derude, later director of AGRITEX, the aims of the irrigation management committees were:

1) To enhance farmer participation in management and decision making at the local level.

2) To prepare the farmers for a compete take-over of management functions currently carried out by government.

3) To create a responsible attitude and a sense of belonging to the scheme so that farmers could view the schemes as their and not simply a government project.

4) To introduce a self-regulatory, self-disciplining machinery at the irrigation scheme to enhance maintenance of discipline, cropping patterns and recommended agronomic practices.

Source: Pazvakavambwa (1984: 423)