Essence of claim of legitimacy over force

Though ideology and discourse will be discussed fully in the theoretical chapter, it is important at the introductory stage to give this footnote about why ideological state apparatus works better in the service of the military than the repressive state apparatus.

This will also summarize all the basic points so far discussed on the aspect of ideology.

First, as argued by Finer (2017), rule by force alone, or the threat of such force, is not adequate; governments must be widely recognized not only as the government but as the lawful and the rightful government. A government that centers its rule on the fact that it is materially stronger than any other force or forces in society would prove both short-lived and ineffectual. The reason is simply that the claim to rule by virtue of superior force invites challenges to any contender who thinks they are strong enough to challenge authority by force. Another issue is the ratio of the armed forces to the populace which is highly disproportionate because as they say in Hausa “the most populous is stronger than one person who is the strongest". Multitudes will certainly trump monolithic strength.

Secondly, the threat of physical compulsion is also not an efficient and economical way of securing obedience. Jones and Peccei (1999) maintain that to secure power, it makes sense to persuade everyone else that what you want is also what they want. By encouraging people to embrace your views of their own concurrence, any cost-conscious ruler can save money on armed forces and police officers. To achieve this, one’s ideology needs to be established or sustained to make the beliefs which you want people to hold appear to be

‘common sense’, or logical or simply inevitable thus making it difficult for them to question your assumptions. If acceptance is by ideological means then there is no need to expend any bullet in coming to power.

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Thirdly, it is also enduring. Finer (2017) provides an interesting analogy regarding a village schoolmaster and his pupils to reemphasize the essence of authority over force. He says that suppose that a village headmaster’s only means for getting his students to come to school, keeping them there, making them regular attenders is by physical force alone.

Imagine him going to the houses of the children, bringing them to school and forcing them to learn. In these circumstances, estimate how much of the schoolmaster's time would be spent in rounding the pupils up and contrast this with the other more common option, that his authority as 'the schoolmaster' is recognized. In these circumstances, he can spend almost the whole of his time on his primary function -teaching. Physical coercion will emerge only as a sanction in negligible cases. This in fact is a cogent treatise on the essence of the ideological establishment of authority over force in a higher up political arrangement involving multitudes of citizens under a single political leader.

Fourthly, right to rule or the creation of political legitimacy vindicates the initial entry and accords positivity to the method of taking over power. It is a point of saying the ends justifies the means. Finer (2017, 75), quoting Victor Hugo’s commentary on Napoleon's legitimization of himself after the plebiscite of 1852, observes that:

Mr. Bonaparte's crime is not a crime, it is called a necessity;

Mr. Bonaparte's ambuscade is not an ambuscade, it is called defence of order; Mr. Bonaparte's robberies are not robberies, they are called measures of state; Mr. Bonaparte's murders are not murders, they are called public safety; Mr.

Bonaparte's accomplices are not called malefactors, they are called magistrates, senators, and councillors of state; Mr.

Bonaparte's adversaries are not the soldiers of the law and right, they are Jack Cades, demagogues, communists.

Similarly, Hebditch and Connor (2009, 28), in their book: How to Stage a Military Coup, provide a humorous glossary to what certain military slogan might entail or mean:

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‘We did it to defend the Constitution!’ A coup victory speech is incomplete without this one… no one will challenge it by asking which specific clause in the constitution legitimizes the overthrow of an elected government by a group of soldiers…

‘Someone had to put an end to corruption!’ This does not mean that the coup leader is against kick-backs and pay- offs. What it means is that he is against getting 10 per cent when he could be getting 20 per cent – not at all the same thing…

‘Power had to be restored to the people!’ What this actually means is ‘Power had to be taken away from the present regime!’…

Or, a favourite of ours: ‘There was no other way!’ This is an excellent one-size-fits-all slogan…

The transformation of Mr. Bonaparte's undoing has to do with the claim of legitimacy and authority and the series of linguistic renaming of his acts show how the cognitive perception of the people has been transformed. The essential point here is the aspect of discourse and the use of euphemism for ideological dissimulation has lent itself to legitimization. Hebditch and Connor’s (2009) peculiar glossary likewise shows the essence of discourse in promoting and disguising ideology.

By and large, the aim here is to reemphasize the essence of authority over violence in the military's claim to power and the reason why this is expedient. As Taiwo (1999, 171) puts it: “even the most coercive of military regimes seeks to cloak itself in some legitimacy or a moral right to govern”. The claim to authority, the aspect of the justification and the representation of the incumbent leaders and the status quo all involve the construction of a perception. The aim of this work is to see this perception in terms of the formation of ideology in coup discourse. Bonaparte's euphemism is one classic example of the work of discursive construction. Finer's (2017) argument regarding the headmaster and force is also strong in terms of the viability of a discursive construction of hegemony that manufactures

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consents and that easily regulates acts and makes people believe that the intervention itself is inevitable and commonsensical.