Nyanyadzi Irritation Management Committee (IMC) activity system

As described above, the farmers do work hand in hand with the Irrigation Management Committee.

The IMC forms an important and fluent activity system in the irrigation scheme. The main object of the IMC is leadership and management of the irrigation scheme and their main outcome is to promote household food security through irrigation farming. In essence, the IMC leads and represents the farmers in decision making processes and all other matters of concern. Hence, the main activity of the IMC is to provide leadership and management skills to the rest of the farmers thereby, leading, guiding, shaping and giving some direction to the farmers’ activity system. The IMC’s activity system does not compete neither is it divorced from the farmers’ activity system, instead it is complimentary. The IMC’s activity system is shown in Figure 4.2 below;

Figure 4.2: Nyanyadzi Irrigation Management Committee’s Activity Systems Source: Author

As shown in Figure 4.2 above, the IMC’s activity system is made up of the subjects whom in this case, are the farmers chosen to represent their other compatriots. Historically, the first plot holder representative committee was put in place in September 1945 allowing the farmers to participate in the management of the scheme (Bolding, 2003: 135). The plot holder representative committee consisted of two plot holders from each block, and the agricultural and community demonstrator as government representatives (ibid, 2003: 138). However, after independence things were no longer the same. The spirit of African nationalism and political ploys by incoming members of parliament for Chimanimani district left Nyanyadzi irrigators more rebellious than ever and

resistant to the previous colonial laid policies on water rates. As narrated by Bolding (2003: 200), The Lancaster House independence negotiations reigned in a new dawn by the end of 1979.

The white irrigation manager had allowed Nyanyadzi irrigation scheme to operate on condition that water rates were paid after harvesting the crops. However, when the time of payment was due (April 1980), the kraalhead committee on behalf of Nyanyadzi plot holders refused to pay. Thus, the committee cashed in on promises of free government services after independence, made by freedom fighters during their nightly rallies. This promise had been reiterated by the newly elected Member of Parliament for Chimanimani district during his victory speech, when he suggested that water rate payments should be done away with. The out-going white District Commissioner, however, stood firm and suggested to the new Minister of Local Government to cut off water supplies to the scheme in case the kraalhead committee persisted in its refusal to pay. To resolve the ensuing standoff, a team of government officials visited the scheme in May 1980. Their investigations revealed that the plot holders had a number of grievances regarding enforcement of water rate payment during water scarce years and exploitation by the marketing co-operative.

Resultantly, the government visiting officers suggested that the existing kraalhead committee must be replaced by a democratically elected farmer committee. This was in line with the new democratic government installed after independence (ZANU-PF), but Ranger (1985) and Kriger (1988) interpreted this move as politically motivated with the intent to facilitate control and strengthen the ruling party over an area that was known for its support to an opposition leader Ndabaningi Sithole. This intent was visible because most of the irrigation committee members came from the local ZANU (PF) party branch in Nyanyadzi.

The newly elected irrigation committee was made of two farmers elected from each block, a chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, vice-secretary, treasurer and three ordinary members. The duties of this Irrigation Management Committee (IMC) were:

(a) To communicate problems and bring solutions (b) To discuss problems with the irrigation manager (c) To recommend individuals for plot allocation

(d) To disseminate information among plot holders (Bolding, 2003: 200).

The IMC organogram in shown in Figure 4.3:

Figure 4.3: Nyanyadzi irrigation’s IMC organogram (1980) Source: AGRITEX Archive Files

It was hoped that the newly elected IMC together with the freshly promoted African irrigation

manager would work together and resolve the outstanding problems in Nyanyadzi irrigation scheme. However, because of the continued resistance and refusal to pay water rates the incoming Irrigation Manager and his extension assistants and water bailiffs were forced to continue the old management style. This left the decisions on cropping programmes, water distribution schedules, maintenance activities and agricultural operations as the prerogative of the Irrigation Manager (Bolding, 2004). In order to instil discipline and maintain order in the irrigation scheme the IMC was asked to draft by-laws that were going to be used. The bylaws were to guide and clearly spell out maintenance of discipline, and the appropriate punishments for violators of the rules. During this period, it was also noted that the IMC were invited into the irrigation scheme meetings only to be told what to do by the Irrigation Manager. This, therefore, means the IMC was just ceremonial and did not have power to influence the management of the scheme. Their involvement and consultations were just a formality, and nothing could change the laid up or predetermined government decisions.

It is also said that the newly elected IMC also did nothing to change the situation and the resistance on water rates continued until the Provincial Agricultural Extension Officer (PAEO) for Manicaland decided to act and he came down to Nyanyadzi irrigation scheme to welcome the new IMC and explain their duties to them. In his speech he laid out the duties as being nothing less than (1) maintaining discipline among plot holders; and (2) encouraging payment of maintenance fees.

In his capacity he also reminded the IMC that, “the committee is meant to assist and never to replace AGRITEX.” In addition, he also instructed that:

maintenance fees to be paid in full before June 30. All plot holders who have paid in full will be issued with the relevant permits. All defaulters will be given a chance to pay before 31st of August. After that date defaulters will be issued with eviction notices showing Government's intention to act (Bolding, 2003: 203).

To his surprise, when he checked the credential of the new IMC members, all the members owed money to the Government and he instructed them to pay before June 30 or else they were going to be forced to resign and the IMC was going to be dissolved on the basis of indebtedness. In response, just after the PAEO had finished his speech, the IMC told him “to go home and never visit again" (Bolding, 2003: 203). In essence, by then Nyanyadzi irrigation scheme was noted to

be the highest defaulter with an outstanding arrears of (Z$202,521) surpassing any other irrigation scheme in Zimbabwe. Unsurprisingly, to date Nyanyadzi irrigation scheme remains one of the major defaulters owing the ZETDC, the electricity utility company over US$60 000 and undisclosed amounts to ZINWA and Odzi Catchment, both water utility parastatal companies.

A history of resistance by the IMC and political intervention in favour of the IMC in Nyanyadzi sounds like a fairy tale. It is said on the 11^th of July 1989 a meeting was held by all irrigation officers at the AGRITEX provincial headquarters where with concern, they singled out Nyanyadzi irrigation scheme as problematic for defaulting the water rates. In an attempt to resolve this, the PAEO made instructions for a physical exercise which intended to see all the defaulters evicted by force or by withholding the water. The physical exercise went on well in all other smallholder irrigation schemes in the province but at Nyanyadzi it was something else,

at Nyanyadzi the IMC (committee) and farmers refused the physical exercise... The farmers were influenced by the IMC... They uttered bad words against government. That the physical exercise is not government policy. That they are not going to vote in favour of the government in the coming election. That the whole thing is being done by the PAEO and the IM. The whole staff must be removed from the scheme and remain communal. That they will make a follow up to the President. That they have declared war with the oppressors…

(AGRITEX Provincial files, Sithole, 1989).

The IMC was said to have sent delegates to meet the provincial chairman of ZANU(PF) and another delegate to the President's office. The ZANU(PF) politicians instructed in the favour of the IMC which saw the Director of AGRITEX bowing down on any operations in Nyanyadzi and the PAEO was forced to repeal his actions (Interviews with AGRITEX Chimanimani district office staff, 1995 cited in Bolding, 2003: 147). Again, this move strengthened the IMC, and it is believed that the government did not want to lose grip on Nyanyadzi community which was heavily aligned to the ZANU-NDONGA, the opposition party led by Ndabaningi Sithole and the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) party led by former ZANU(PF) secretary general Edgar Tekere. Hence, this was the best chance to gain and strengthen support from the community. The move by government resulted in disinterest by the PAEO and the Irrigation Manager (IM) while, the IMC became an active farmer body that tried to resolve the scheme’s problems by approaching the relevant political

authorities, whilst side-lining the AGRITEX (Bolding, 2003).

Another moment reported was during the 1990-91 season, when the IMC invited the Minister of Agriculture and Governor to force the Irrigation Manager and the AGRITEX into a discussion on the following: “(1) hand-over of Nyanyadzi irrigation scheme to the farmers; (2) exemption of maintenance fees; (3) construction of a new pumping station to replace the failing old diesel engines” (AGRITEX Chimanimani District files, 8 February 1991). The IMC successfully managed to influence the local ZANU(PF) MP for Chimanimani district into action and the MP and district (ZANU-PF) party leadership “repeatedly pressured the AGRITEX to waive payment of maintenance fees and speed up construction of the new electrical pump station on the Odzi river”

(AGRITEX Chimanimani District files, 17 December 1991). This meant that the culture of politicising and indulging political figures in the irrigation scheme’s challenges was incubated successfully. These traits live up to date in the selection and functioning of the IMC in Nyanyadzi irrigation scheme.

It is important to mention that, with the successful roping in of political figures into the management of the irrigation scheme and the continued resistance of the water rates and constant call for payment waivers, the Irrigation Manager together with AGRITEX suffered an internal defeat in the control and management of the scheme. There was never an official handover of the irrigation scheme to communal management but the Irrigation Manager and the AGRITEX staff gave in to the pressure and have little interest in the management of the scheme except on extension work. This made Nyanyadzi IMC stronger and it continues to side-line the IM and the AGRITEX in its functioning.

Moving onwards, the IMC’s roles in the irrigation scheme changed and they became actively in charge of the irrigation management and control. In essence, the IMC roles now include day in and day out engagement with irrigation’s mediation instruments such as water, plots and other mediation tools like the irrigation constitution and other specific committee work descriptions. On a daily basis the IMC are also faced with real situation contradictions that may arise in several connected activities. One of the prominent actions the IMC monitors is the water distribution rosters and these involve daily visits to specific blocks and liaison with the block members and

agreement on the day’s watering roster. As Bolding (2003, 148) argued that, “the story of the making of Nyanyadzi project is one of water. Water has remained the most powerful (f)actor shaping the possibilities and impossibilities for realising the dream. Water acts through its abundance as well as its conspicuous absence.” Hence, water allocation process becomes one critical action in the activity system and a co-shared responsibility between the IMC, Extension workers and the farmers daily. Due to the prevailing political-economy situation in Zimbabwe and family relationships in Nyanyadzi, accompanied by unscrupulous corruption activities, water as a mediation tool/instrument has been complicated and became a source of high tension, conflict and dissonance in the farmers’ activity system. The complication is further complicated by illegal leasing together with complex multiple plot holder arrangements in the irrigation scheme. These manifestations are further described and explained in detail in the sections and chapters to follow.

The IMC’s activity system becomes pivotal and important to the survival and progression of the irrigation scheme since it is also the responsible organ that manages the finances of the irrigation scheme. In essence, through the treasurer the IMC manages the finances and are responsible for paying out all the utility bills, flighting and awarding all the tendering systems. Of late this has also been an area of high mistrust, abuse, under reporting and contestation. The IMC’s have been constantly shuffled and changed over high allegations of financial misuse, mismanagement and lack of any financial reports, records or accounting. Resultant, the irrigation scheme is reported to be in high debt with the likes of ZESA (in the regions of US$60 000) and undisclosed amounts of money owed to ZINWA and Odzi Catchment for water abstraction as mentioned above.

The IMC is also responsible for coordinating and managing the government farmer input programmes. Such programmes give farmers planting inputs including seed and fertilisers among others and because the IMC has been running this program having taken the responsibility from AGRITEX, heavy criticism and blame for high level corruption, disappearing of the farming inputs, poor accountability and record keeping is resulting in some farmers over subscribing, and other individual business people receiving the inputs without any reported ownership of a farming plot and most plot holder farmers are failing to receive any of the hand-outs (Pers. Comm, 2019).

This has led to the IMC being described as the most corrupt entity influencing the farmers’ activity system, hence it has rotated a lot.

The other important thing is that, of recent there has been a deliberate attachment of the IMC to national politics (dominance of ZANU-PF). In essence, there has been a deliberate high political influence in defining the way the IMC members are chosen, how should they be politically aligned and resultantly, there has been high instability in the IMC itself, influencing and interacting with the broader farmer activity system. This has been detrimental to the collective activity and the partially shared object across the activity systems in the irrigation scheme. More deliberations on thus are found in the following sections and in the next chapter.