Raison d’ État and Police Reason

Foucault argues that the end of the Roman Empire³² and the emergence of legal sovereignty in Europe during the mid-17th Century, codified by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, formed the backdrop for the development of raison d’ État. This was a rationality that

32 Foucault suggests the end of the Roman Empire should in fact be situated in the year 1648 which was when the realisation came into being that the Empire would no longer be the form of organisation for states (1978b, p. 291).

48 considered the formation and growth of the state, not according to divine, human or natural laws, but rather according to a “rationality specific to the art of governing states” (Foucault (2001) as cited in Olssen et al. 2006, p. 27). This mentality of rule found its rationality in those

‘realities’ that comprised, and were particular to, the state and according to the state’s strength (Dean 1997, p. 184; Foucault 1991b, p. 97; Gordon 1991: 9; Olssen et al. 2006, p. 27). The development of this rational form of “knowledge” diverged from Machiavelli’s influential thinking. The latter sought to conceive of, and describe the ‘Prince’s’ relationship to the state; a relationship that was constantly under threat as the Prince’s claim to his principality was limited to inheritance or conquest and, therefore, vulnerable to acquisition. In contrast to such thinking, raison d’ État expressed concerns around the functioning and survival of the state

“without subordinating it to the problematic of the Prince and of his relationship to the principality of which he is lord and master” (Foucault 1991b, p. 89). To do this, attempts to generate “knowledge” of the reality of the state with regard to its population ratio, mortality and birth rates, and trends of wealth accumulation, were undertaken. This gave rise to the use of statistics – a group of technical “knowledges” that sought to account for the ‘realities’ and workings of the state (Foucault 1978b, p. 274) – and the formation of administrative apparatuses. Both were required to procure and reproduce the “knowledges” necessary to govern and to execute the orders of the sovereign.

By the 17^th Century, political reasoning understood sovereignty as “the exercise of ultimate authority over a territory and the subjects who inhabit that territory” (Dean 2009, p.

104). During this time, these newly formed units (states) also started to ‘assert’ themselves due to increased economic interaction and other forms of exchange between them. The space of interaction between states was characterised by increased competition with regard to trade, wealth accumulation, sea dominance, territorial conquest and the like. Unsurprisingly, given

49 the ultimate concern of raison d’ État, namely, state preservation, it also monitored the changes that occurred vis-à-vis other states. These articulations highlighted the need for state security through the development of those elements or ‘forces’ concerned with the strength of the state (ibid, p. 89). So, the concern was “[n]o longer territorial expansion, [but] the development of the state’s forces; no longer the combination of legacies through dynastic alliances, but the composition of state forces in political and provisional alliances” (Foucault 1978b, pp. 285- 291). The implementation of this ‘rationalisation of forces’ was dependent on the development of two technological assemblages, that is, military-diplomatic apparatuses and the apparatus of police – the second of which developed into a governmental rationality. The military- diplomatic apparatus was used to manage and advance the state’s relationship with other European states to maintain a ‘balance of power’, or ‘equilibrium’. Paradoxically, however, in order for the creation of equilibrium between states, each state required a ‘good’ police to

“prevent the relation of forces being turned to its disadvantage” (ibid, pp. 313-315). The notion of ‘police’ refers not to what is understood today as ‘the police’ but to the complex ways that the internal ‘forces of the state’ could be enhanced and increased while the good order of the state was maintained (ibid, p. 313). European equilibrium and police also shared a common instrument – namely, statistics. The constitutive “knowledges” of the state’s own forces as well as that of the states it was in competition with were necessary to maintain this equilibrium through comparative calculation between states.³³

In Foucault’s view, the exercise of police was inseparable from mercantilism. This referred to the pursuit of state strength and competition through commerce and economic relations to promote inter-state equilibrium. However, in response to the workings of

33 These calculations saw a collection of writings, termed Polizeiwissenschaft or ‘science of police’ – concerned with the populations of the state and its regulation – emerge in Germany. It “spread throughout Europe, […extending] crucial influence” (Foucault 1978b, p. 318, my emphasis) from the end of the 17^th Century until the end of the 18^th Century.

50 mercantilism, police reason came under increased scrutiny and was systematically dismantled through the articulation of certain ‘economic problems’ during the first half of the 18^th Century.

Critiques levelled against police reason were observable in the 18th Century through the writings of the économistes³⁴ which came to define a modified state rationality. This was because their writings “introduced...some of the fundamental lines of modern and contemporary governmentality” (Foucault 1978b, p. 348). These transformations in governmental reason included a conceptualisation of the population as a collective body; the idea of a ‘civil society’ came about as “a specific field of naturalness peculiar to man [sic]” and became the “necessary correlate of the state” (ibid, p. 350). The second transformation is linked to the idea of ‘scientific “knowledge”’ which required that the rule of evidence, endemic to

‘scientific’ inquiry, had to be exercised within economic domains. The notion of political economy which subsequently emerged was not considered “knowledge” of government; rather, it was seen as “knowledge” internal to government. It became essential for the exercise of what was called ‘good’ government. This particular transformation was related to the construction of the economy and the population as subject to ‘natural processes’ which implied that forms of regulation should not be imposed on these domains. So, government practices over populations were ‘natural processes’. Governmental reason, therefore, had to work with these processes and, instead of opposing them – manage, steer and enhance their outcomes. The implementation and reception of these so-called ‘natural intrinsic processes’ within populations also saw the incorporation of the idea of freedom into governmental reason. This necessitated the fundamental respect for the legitimacy of individuals (within the population) as a necessary requirement of government. It was within these discursive shifts, as the next section will argue,

34 The économistes argued for increased production, spontaneous price regulation, less state regulation of the population and its size as well as free trade between states which had to be regulated by private interests and competition as opposed to by the state (Foucault 1978b, pp. 343-348).

51 that the idea of citizens as ‘free subjects’ emerged and the development towards modern governmentality began (ibid, pp. 325-353).