Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the US, UK, Europe and other countries. African" refers to the people belonging to the mainly Bantu-speaking ethnic groups of South Africa; "Coloured" are the people of the Republic who were
R.T Manchester, 2008
Throughout this book, the term "white" refers to those individuals whose predecessors were most often European settlers; the expression.
INTRODUCTION
S. Strategic Interests in South Africa
In the prevailing climate of the Cold War, it was not difficult to go from the ANC, through the SACP, directly to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union controlled the majority of the world's remaining reserves of chromium, manganese, vanadium, and the platinum group metals (see Table 1.1).
S. Economic Interests in South Africa
Ford of South Africa was formed in 1923 with its own assembly plant in Port Elizabeth to exploit this market. Imports from South Africa to the United States followed a similar pattern, registering US$104 million at the end of the war and US$3,321 million in 1980.
S. Interests and Human Rights in South Africa
If Washington DC needed further reminder of its human rights interests in South Africa, beyond this domestic resonance, the UN similarly highlighted the issue of apartheid throughout the second half of the twentieth century. The strategic and economic interests of the United States should have resulted in a close relationship between the U.S.
MUTUAL COOPERATION” AND “SERIOUS CONCERN”: THE TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER
South Africa was thus seen as a useful, if not essential, ally for the United States in the early Cold War. Economic ties between the United States and South Africa also developed under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.
THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS”
THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, 1961–1963
After the Sharpeville shooting in 1960, there was a mass flight of capital from the Republic. Naud é, Pretoria's ambassador to the United States, noted in 1961 that South Africa had "many friends" in the United States.
A FRUSTRATINGLY DIFFICULT SET OF POLICY CONSIDERATIONS TO JUGGLE”
THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION, 1963–1969
Johnson stated, “The foreign policy of the United States is rooted in its life at home. Another aspect of the Johnson administration that clarified the 1963 arms embargo was the restriction of high-level visits by South African military personnel to the United States.
THE NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATIONS, 1969–1977
The first of five sections will present the background to the South African policies of the Nixon and Ford administrations. Export-Import Bank, until the implementation of the arms embargo.8 First, the US For most of this period, the nature of the United States' South Africa policy can be traced to decisions made in 1969 Review of NSSM39.
There was a danger that no side in the conflict would be satisfied with the position of the United States. Yet it would be misleading to present the United States' South Africa policy in the first half of the 1970s as a methodical or even narrow application of option two. Since 1963, the arms embargo against South Africa has been central to the US.
Buff um.74 Likewise, the United States rejected proposals to change the status of the UN. South Africa was never going to be a priority in the upper echelons of Nixon and Ford executives.
ANDY YOUNG IS NOT A POLICY”
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, 1977–1981
Botha even spoke of the necessity for white South Africa to "adapt or die."4 But the damage had been done. The new administration benefited from a number of individuals within the higher levels of the State Department with prior knowledge and interest in South Africa. The United States did not want to be seen talking to South Africa under the full gaze of the international press unless there was to be a guaranteed degree of cooperation.
In an effort to divert South Africa from its Turnhalle plans, the United States helped establish a parallel negotiating forum. Five Western members of the UN moved negotiations away from previous unproductive contacts between South Africa and the UN. In November 1978, the United States arranged for the return of South Africa's advance payment for the undelivered uranium contracts.
Companies with affiliates in the Republic of South Africa: the so-called Sullivan principles (see Table 6.2).107. Later, toward the end of the administration's tenure, Moose was again invited to voice what he believed Carter's executive branch had accomplished regarding the republic.
NEITHER THE CLANDESTINE EMBRACE NOR THE POLECAT TREATMENT”
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, 1981–1984
One of the first actions of Constructive Engagement was to reverse President Carter's 1978 total ban on US Constructive Engagement, also allowing for increased direct contact between United States and South African security agencies. Washington DC, at least in the eyes of the State Department, was not yet ready to ease the embargo on the Republic's highest-ranking military personnel visiting the United States.35.
Constructive engagement was not a policy designed solely to meet US strategic concerns. Instead, the Reagan administration looked for a solution that would address US security interests throughout the region. It was a negotiating framework that would also serve America's broader containment strategy.
However, this style of relationship did not continue with the advent of the Reagan administration. In fact, the Reagan administration linked its South African policy to the fate of the National Party's reform program.
THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEN QUIET DIPLOMACY IS NOT ENOUGH”
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, 1984–1986
Within weeks of the start of the unrest, the South African Defense Force (SADF) was deployed to the villages, along with the South African Police. Congress had chosen to tread only the edges of the executive's policy towards the Republic. A measure of the Reagan administration's frustration with the South African government can be found in Washington DC's decision to delay the receipt of the credentials of the Republic's newly appointed ambassador to the United States.
At the heart of the administration's South Africa strategy remained the constants of the early 1980s. Perhaps the best example of the Reagan administration's misplaced optimism was in August 1985, with the events surrounding P.W. For any engagement policy to succeed in the second half of the 1980s, the Reagan administration would have needed some kind of political umbrella to be provided by the South African government.
The second constant of the Reagan administration's mid-1980s South Africa policy was the continued rejection of any call to isolate the Republic's economy. Instead, the "growing economic power of the black majority" can best eradicate racial discrimination in the Republic.
SANCTIONS BY THEMSELVES DO NOT REPRESENT A POLICY”: THE REAGAN, BUSH,
After the passage of the CAAA, apartheid was never again such a divisive political issue for the United States, and as a result, the United States lost the televised images that had done so much to fuel political debate in the mid-1980s. The administration's most questionable interpretations of the 1986 law were related to the purchase of uranium and bank loans.
The Reagan administration also circumvented three other provisions of the comprehensive anti-apartheid bill of 1986. Instead, the United States would use its veto in the Security Council to frustrate such multilateral action.15 Alan L. explained the refusal to perform CAAA. States was about maintaining and developing contacts with all parties in the Republic in order to facilitate the negotiation process.
The US role in helping to bring about democracy in South Africa will continue to be active.”92 This favored the positions, at this time, of the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).
CONCLUSION
Since the beginning of the discussions in the United Nations, Washington DC has always supported the majority view that Pretoria should relinquish its mandate over South West Africa and transfer responsibility for this territory to the UN. Simply put, based on the language used and the empowerment programs implemented, Habib's criteria were "without a doubt" met. As a result, contacts between the two countries' military establishments were, at least initially, close, and Truman and Eisenhower helped rearm South Africa after World War II.
However, Pretoria was only considered useful, not essential, to the Cold War prospects of the United States. In effect, the United States has sacrificed its core strategic interests in this part of the world. The United States was therefore at odds with majority opinion for most of the apartheid era.
Being so long-term in its ambitions and without decisive action, it could not match the simplicity of the call for immediate criminal sanctions. If Washington DC was to block the majority's efforts, the onus was now on the US.
NOTES
Martin's Press, 1999; and Robert Kinloch Massie, Losing the bonds: the United States and South Africa in the apartheid years. South Africa's reluctance to send its own troops and equipment to Korea is illustrated in the memo of the conversation, Jooste, Acheson and Satterthwaite, July 24, 1950. United States influence over the World Bank secured an additional loan worth US$160 to South Africa for this and similar purposes.
RG59-NARA; Jesse Johnson, Proposed additional heads of agreement between the South African Union Atomic Energy Board and the Joint Development Agency. 215; and the Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of South Africa concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. Nations, see Lorna Lloyd, "A Better Beginning": The 1946 United Nations General Assembly and the Question of the Treatment of Indians in South Africa.
See also Rusk's account of how the United States nearly severed diplomatic relations with South Africa over Pretoria's refusal to accept African-American Foreign Service personnel in South Africa. This memo also documented that the Kennedy administration sought to "prevent Lockheed from making a final decision on this matter until our negotiations with South Africa to extend the existing missile tracking facility arrangements have been completed".
