Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit
Cape Town
ELECTRICAL AND ALLIED WORKERS TRADE UNION OF
SOUTH AFRICA:
A HI STORY-
Shireen Mohamed Working Paper No.81
February 1991
ISBN 0-7992-1315-2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the following people:
Dudley Horner for his invaluable editing and guidance.
The Labour Research Programme at SALDRU for making this entire project possible, - particularly Paul Lundall for his
supportive role throughout.
The unionists who gave of their time and experiences.
The workers who have served as constant
inspiration through their day to day
struggles.
Contents
INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter 1 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WHITE
UNION 9
1.1 The Emergence of Craft Unions in South Africa . . . 9 1.2 Response to the Industrial Conciliation
Amendment Act 1956: The Birth of the Electrical and Allied Trades Union of
South Africa . . . 17 1.3 Response to Wiehahn: Birth of Electrical
and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (EAWUSA) . . . • 23
Chapter 2 THE STRUGGLE BEGINS:- THE BIRTH OF
"SPARKY" 27
2.1 The Effects of this Period on EATUSA
.
312.2 The 'Constitutional' crisis (Nov. "
'79-'80)
· · · · · · · · · · · ..
382.3 ,The Period of Consolidation (1980
-
1984)
. . · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
412.3.1 Response of NEC
· '. · · ·
442.3.2 Progressives are voted onto the
NEC
· · · · · '. ·
' '· · · ·
46Chapter 3 THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION:
1985-1986 49
3.1 The Merger . . . 49 3.1.1 The Federation of Electrical Trades
Unions of South Africa (FETUSA) • 49 3.1.2 Events leading up to the Merger . 52
3.2 The Most Significant Changes
1985-1986 . . . . . 53 3.2.1 Major Gains Made . . . . . 66 3.2.2 Progressive Tradition Entrenched 67 3.2.3 The Metal and Electrical Workers
Union of South Africa (MEWUSA) 67
CONCLUSION 73
A PARALLEL UNIONS ESTABLISHED BY SAEWA 79
B HISTORICAL AFFILIATION OF SAEWA 81
C MEMBERSHIP FIGURES FOR SAEWA, EATUSA, EAWUSA AND EAWTUSA
D JOB CATEGORIES AND HOURLY WAGE RATES IN THE ELECTRICAL CONTRACTING INDUSTRY, 1973 -
1990
E NUMBER OF NEW APPRENTICES REGISTERED 1981 - 83
85
1988 87
REFERENCES 89
BOOKS, THESES AND ARTICLES . . . . . . 89 NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS . . . 92 DOCUMENTS
INTERVIEWS
List Of Tables
92 92
Tbl.C.1: Membership figures for SAEWA, EATUSA, EAWUSA AND EAWTUSA . . . 83 Tbl.D.1: Job categories and hourly wage rates .85
I I
Tbl.E.1: New Apprentices Registered 1981-1988 ~87
INTRODUCTION
This paper attempts to chronicle the history of the Electrical and Allied Workers Trade Union of South Africa (EAWTUSA) with particular emphasis on the period 1977 - 1986. It focusses on an aspect of the organisational
(trade union) life of the working class in South Africa, which flows from, and reflects the increasing pressure which that class has brought to bear on society as a whole.
Most notably from 1973 onwards (but with renewed impetus in 1976), the various struggles of the working class have left their imprint on politics, economics and even culture.
On the economic level, the growth of the independent black trade union movement in the 1970' sand 1980' s directly affected the profitability and competitiveness of the manufacturing industry. 1 The new, militant black unions demanded and won bigger and bigger wage increases for their predominantly semi-skilled and unskilled members. Thus, real wages for African workers in the decade of the 1970's increased by 56% compared to only 30% in the decade of the 1960's.2
This growth in labour cost coupled with low world demand and high inflation had serious implications for manufacturing and is pivotal to any explanation for the significant outflow of forei~n capital from South Africa that started in about 1976. Higher labour costs made locally manufactured goods even more expensive than they had historically been and therefore even less competitive in a depressed world market. 4
The high inflation rate in this same period lowered even further the demand for manufactured goods. Hence the exodus of foreign capital in search of more profitable
1. Gelb S, 1988, p13.
2. Handbook of Labour and Social Statistics, SALDRU,I986. In the South African context, in this period, African workers are largely unskilled and semi-skilled workers.
3. Kahn B, 1988, p16.
4. Black A, 1985, p6.
areas. More recently, the higher wages won by the unionised goldmine workers and the resultant implications for the cost of gold production, as well as the Congress of South African Trade Union's and others' call for sanctions and disinvestment, have had a profound effect on the economy.5
The stamp of the working class on political life has been even more profound. After more than a decade of convulsive but increasingly militant political struggle, with the high point being reached in the period 1984 1986, the working class has posed a clear alternative to Apartheid Capitalism: Socialism.6 In this process of developing a consciousness of itself as a class, the working class has developed a range of organisational forms through which the political struggle is pursued. It developed street committees, people's courts, civic associations, youth congresses and the trade unions. The trade unions, in particular, have played a crucial political as well as economic role.
Putting the question of Socialism on the agenda provoked different responses from the state. While its repressive measures were directed against the working class activists in the townships and the trade unions, the state's reform programme aimed to prevent socialist revolution. In fact, the question of Socialism had become so real, that the ruling class itself was forced to fight it on an ideological level also. Representatives of this class, such as Clem Sunter, have been obliged publicly to weigh the comparative virtues of Capitalism and socialism. 7 The fact that they are talking about a 'mixed economy', combining both elements of Capitalism and Socialism attests to the political weight of the working class in South Africa today.
5. Freund B, 1988.
6. Cobbett Wand Cohen R, 1987, pS.
7. Sunler C, 1987.
But the political pressure Qf the working class has not only affected the state and the- ruling class - it has fundamentally affected the political organisation supported by the majority of Blacks i.e. the African National Congress (ANC). Whereas the ANC earlier considered the role of the black working class in the struggle for 'national liberation' to be 'special', the intense working class struggles in the 1980s in particular have obliged them to concede 'the leading role' to the working class.
The working class has thus determined the terrain of black and white politics, raising in the case of black politics many new and important questions such as the validity of the South African Communist Party's two-stage theory of revolution in South Africa and how the working class is to ensure its leadership role in the struggle.
In broader social terms, not only has the working class left its imprint on economics and politics, but on culture as well. Apart from the initiative towards 'working class culture', initiated by the Federation of South African Trade Unions, publications including novels, biographies and poetry often display a preoccupation with working class life. So too does theatre and art. In addition, at university level, courses quite often include studying for example the Russian Revolution in order to draw comparisons with South Africa, as well as Marxist philosophy and economic thought. This reflects once again the intensity of class struggle waged by the working class.
Given the essential social and political become within South African life, it is various aspects of the working class' documented and analysed.
actor it has important that own life be The specific focus on the Electrical and Allied Workers Trade Union, is explained by the extent to which it allows us to look at how certain sections of the working class (the black skilled workers) responded to (i) the economic decline starting in the early 1970s, and (ii) the growth of the independent black trade union movement, and also (iii)
the growing general political militancy of the black working class as a whole.
Chapter One reviews the formation of the white South African Electrical Workers Association (SAEWA) in 1937. As in almost all other branches of industry at that time, skilled work in the electrical industry was performed almost exclusively by white workers. There were, however, some 'coloured' and Indian skilled workers in the industry.
But on the whole, white workers were able to protect their craft. So much was this so, that they could rely solely on the principle of the 'rate for the job' for this purpose.
As early as the 1940s, Capital had managed to effect a degree of deskilling in the industry. This paper shows how SAEWA responded by drawing semi-skilled black workers into its ranks. It saw this strategy of organising and drawing into its ranks those workers who could potentially undercut the wage rates of its members as the best guarantee against further deskilling. Thus, SAEWA's 'non racialism', like that of some other craft unions, was determined to a significant degree by pure economic self interest. This policy could not conceal the fact that SAEWA was continually shifting to the right politically. In 1950 SAEWA left the Trades and Labour Council (TLC) as a result.
By this time the TLC had come to be dominated by the growing militancy of the mainly semi- and unskilled unions.
During the 1950s, the South African economy boomed. The need for skilled labour increased. Capital could no longer tolerate the control exercised by SAEWA. Nor was the problem confined to the electrical industry. Manufacturing as a whole suffered from an assault on skilled work. The state responded via the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act, which was aimed at achieving two things. Firstly, the Act outlawed 'mixed' unions such as SAEWA. Secondly, it legally entrenched job reservation.
Chapter One shows how white skilled workers were instrumental in initiating the Unity Committee mainly to resist the dissolution of mixed unions. This was not in
.• ,.· .... ·r
support of any non-racial principle, but because protection of their skill depended upon the continued existence of such unions. When this resistance was defeated, SAEWA changed its strategy by initiating the formation of- a parallel union and thereafter dominating it, right up until 1985. After 1956, a separate union, the Electrical and Allied Trades Union of South Africa (EATUSA), consisting of 'coloured' workers was formed. Nevertheless through manipulation of the closed shop and control of the Apprenticeship Committee white electrical workers continued to exercise significant control over the labour process in the industry.
This, however, was mostly the case in the Transvaal, where many electrical workers were employed on the mines, the area o~ much deskilling. In the Western Cape, the area on which we concentrate in this paper, the situation with regard to deskilling was different. Here electrical work was confined mainly to electrical contracting, and 'coloured' workers entered the industry as skilled workers steadily through the decades, although 'coloured' apprentices were only indentured from 1972 onwards. The strategy of SAEWA in relation to these workers was the same: complete organisational domination.
Constitutionally and legally, SAEWA 'andEATUSA were completely independent and separate organisations. In reality, as Chapter TWo will show SAEWA exercised tight control over EATUSA right up until 1985. The challenge to its control and interference started much earlier and is examined in detail in Chapter Two. The process of economic crisis which South Africa experienced from the early 1970s onwards brought about, the political crisis. From 1973 onwards, black workers started organising into trade unions in their thousands. At the same time, Black Consciousness started to take root, signalling a process of political ferment within the working class as a whole as well as among students where it originated. The ultimate symbolic expression of. this was the 1976 student riots. _
A combination of economic decline and the general increase in the political temperature of the working class is what first sparked resistance to the bureaucratic control by SAEWA of EATUSA. This process of resistance is described in great detail in Chapter Two. While African workers had witnessed a rise in real wages of 56% in the period 1970 to 1980, white workers saw their real wages increase by only 14,9% in the same period.8 The skilled workers in EATUSA were no exception. In addition to the attack on their living standards, they were of course, not immune to the political struggles being waged around them.
It was therefore no accident that the first challenge to SAEWA's hegemony and control arose in 1977. The initial incident described in chapter Two itself appeared of no great importance and concerned a single individual. It resulted, however, in the formation of a core group of young union members, who began to raise questions around EATUSA's constitution, management and leadership: in effect about democracy, responsibility and accountability.
Chapter Two further traces the long battle fought by the core group as they struggled to free EATUSA from SAEWA' s unwanted control as well as detailing the kinds of manoeuvres and wangles employed to block and frustrate the progressives. Finally, it will be seen how the tenacity of a small handful of individuals won the day, in 1984.
Chapter Three examines SAEWA's motives for establishing an umbrella body, the Federation of Electrical Workers of South Africa (FETUSA). It also outlines the developments that led to the merger between EATUSA and the Electrical and Allied Workers Trade Union of South Africa (EAWUSA) in October 1985. It reveals how the slow chipping away by the core group and the increasing power it won in this process allowed it to start introducing a new tradition into EATUSA, after 1985 and even before the final split with SAEWA. This new tradition was essentially that of workers' democracy and workers' control that became so prominent in
8. Handbook of Labour and Social Statistics, SALDRU, 1986.
the independent black trade union movement. Control of the Cape Town Branch Committee (in 1980) and representation on the National Executive Council (in 1984), all described in Chapter Two, made possible a new departure of prime importance: the organision of labourers on building sites.
Chapter Three also examines how the union broadened its base in 1986 to include factory workers in the metal and electronics industries.
The argument put is that the appointment of a progressive organiser in the western Cape in February 1985, whereafter various progressive transformations occurred, played an important part in this process. The significant degree of support of skilled workers for the transformation is also demonstrated.
The combined effect of the general political struggles of the working class and the impressive new tradition of the independent unions impacting on a historically conservative section of the working class, namely skilled workers, receives due consideration in Chapter Three.
A note on sources used in this paper is necessary. Finding information for Chapter One was extremely problematic and we had to rely extensively on SAEWA's journal Power for the period 1939 to 1986. In addition, books dealing with early trade union history provided some background, although this was very limited.
For Chapters Two and Three we relied very heavily on interviews with union officials. We interviewed three of the five core group members. Newspaper articles, in particular the Cape Herald for Chapter Two, proved very useful in tracing the chronology of the history,· which served as background for the interviews. The Western Cape Branch newspaper, 'Sparky', selected documents and pamphlets given to us by the union, and national executive council minutes for 1984/1985 added to our understanding of the struggle in this period.
c
H A p T ETHE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WHITE UNION 1.1 The Emergence of Craft Unions in South
Africa
R
1
With the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa in 1867 and 1885 respectively, and the subsequent growth of a more sophisticated manufacturing sector, the demand for more skilled labour arose. Because of the virtual complete absence of artisans in South Africa itself, skilled immigrants were recruited mainly from Britain and Australia. 9 Besides the technical expertise, the immigrant artisans brought with them a rich experience of trade union traditions and organisations.10
Artisans' unions were thus not only started by British immigrants but in most cases were affiliated to British Unions. Initially craft unions were organised in the printing, engineering, mechanics, boilermaking, carpentry and building industries. 11 In 188112 , a branch of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners was .established, and between 1886 and 1893, branches of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (later called the Amalgamated Engineering Union) were founded in Kimberley, Durban and Johannesburg. The Iron Moulders' society and the SA Engine Drivers' Association were established in 1896, and in that same year the SA Typographical Union absorbed various typographical societies that had been set up earlier.
The South African Electrical Workers Association
9. Ncube N, 19&5, p22 10. Horrel M, 1%1, pI 11. Ncube N, 19&5, P 23
12. This information from Horrel M, 1961, pI
(SAEWA), registered in 1937, was one of the last of the earlier wave of the major artisan unions to be established.
In 1933 electricians in the Building Industry in the Transvaal were considering the formation of an Electrical Trade Union, but were persuaded to form an Electrical Branch of an existin~ Union the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU).1 It soon became apparent that because of the many ramifications of the electrical industry and because of the limited certificate14 of registration of the AEU, the leaders of that Union found it difficult to involve electricians in its activities. 1S The result was that a meeting was convened with representatives from the Mines and it was decided to inaugurate a purely Electrical Trade Union.
The first mass meeting was held in the Brakpan Town Hall on the 16th December, 1936, to be followed by a series of meetings throughout the Witwatersrand and Pretoria, and so great was the response that the South African Electrical Workers Association (SAEWA) was registered on the 25th May, 1937, for the Mining Industry in the Transvaal Province. 16 At the date of registration there were 650 members in 10 branches all on the Witwatersrand.17 A national electrical trade union was desired. Consequently the Executive Council commenced discussion with other centres. A branch was opened in Durban on 11 November, 1937, to be followed by another in Kimberley at Easter 1939. In May, 1939 the Port Elizabeth Branch was inaugurated.
Additional branches were established at Witbank, Vereeniging and Pretoria and although the Association was originally only registered for the Mining
13. Power, the official journal of SAE\V A, May 1940, p2
14. Certificate of registration detennines both industrial and geographical scope of a registered union.
15. Power, March, 1987, p7 16. Power, May 1940, p2 17. Power, September 1947, pI
Industry, by May 1940 it had obtained registration for the Building and Engineering Industries and Municipalities and membership had increased to 3 127.18 The union grew steadily over the next two decades to reach a membership of 12 000 by March 1960.19
The union proved active in more general trade union 'affairs and had already joined the Trades and Labour Council (TLC) in 1939. The TLC was an umbrella body and largely a response to the economic depression in South Africa in the early 1930' s when the need for greater unity was felt by the existing co-ordinating bodies. It represented the Trade Union Council, the Cape Labour Federation and unions not affiliated to either of these two bodies. 20 SAEWA remained affiliated until 1950 when, along with the other craft unions, it broke away and established the South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU see below). During its affiliation it played a pivotal role in determining the activities and direction of the Federation. In fact, Jerry Calder, who was General secretary of SAEWA at the time', 21 was vice- president of the TLC in 1944 and became president in 1947.
Any examination of SAEWA during the period of affiliation to the TLC must deal with the changing attitude of the Association to the racial question and the organisation of African workers. Jon Lewis22 convincingly argues that the breakdown of unity in the TLC and the division within the labour movement at the end of the forties must be ascribed mainly to the changing labour process and the division of labour, rather than to any racist or Nationalist ideologies.
Furthermore, he maintains, that earlier craft unions
18. Power, September 1947, pI 19. Power, May 1960 pI 20. Horrel M, 1961, p12 21. Power, March 1987, p7 22. Lewis, J, 1984, p179.
[
had a monopoly of skills and therefore did not have to resort to strategies of racial exclusion and it was this that allowed them to ally with the milit"ant industrial unions and to support the TLC's non-racial policies. The craft unions were thus able to safeguard their members by virtue of a monopoly of skills and control over the labour process. But, during the 1940s, the alliance broke down as a process of mechanisation and craft- dilution took place. 23 Faced with a loss of skills and consequent control over the labour process, the old craft unions set about redefining demarcation lines on the basis of race. This threat to the bargaining position of the old craft unions forced some of them to reconstitute themselves as craft-diluted unions and to organise the lower section of the skilled labour hierarchy.M
The strategy of racial exclusion implemented through the industrial conciliation machinery was in conflict with the interests of African workers and ran counter to the non-racial tradition of the TLC.25 It seemed that the leaders of the craft unions preferred to control African unions through a system of parallel unionism.
While the available evidence26 for SAEWA appears to confirm the above analysis, it is necessary to qualify this. The development of racial forms of protection in industry cannot merely be explained in terms of the changing labour process, but should be accompanied by an explanation of a racially discriminatory hierarchy in the division of labour. It is important not to take for granted the racial differentiation within the labour process, but to situate the division of labour within the context of a racially segregated society in South Africa.27 Historically, the late development of
23. Lewis J, 1984, P 179 M. De Qercq P, 1980, p20.
25. Lewis J, 1984, p156.
26. This is based on a close reading of Power from 1939 to 1986.
27. De Qercq P, 1980, p21.
capitalism .in South Africa determined the. racial._form that capitalism was to take.
Since its inception SAEWA had always propagated its own brand of racism. It argued that the best protection for artisans against undercutting of their wages and status was in fact the policy of equal pay for equal work or what is.referred to as 'the rate for the job.' In July 1943 in the editorial of the union magazine, the Association's position with regard to organising African workers was very clearly stated.
'Those who approach the problem from a racial or colour angle are demonstrating an utter lack of comprehension of fundamental economic facts;
economics pays no regard to colour and creed but is concerned only with the development and
exploitation of cheap labour markets ..•
Discrimination on the basis of colour suits the interests of Capitalism and can only divide workers against themselves. The simple truth is that we are governed by a money machine which would, i f practical and possible, relegate Europeans to the ranks of the unemployed and employ the cheapest labour.'~
The article concludes by suggesting that the Association consider the formation of Native representative groups within the framework of the Association. At this stage there was already a clear recognition of the threat posed by unorganised labour - be it of any colour. Throughout this period there is a very explicit and consistent support for the policy of the 'rate for the job' but it is always in anticipation of the threat posed by African workers selling their labour power at a cheaper rate. The solution proposed at that early time was to organise Africans in parallel structures and in so doing channel and control their demands. 29 In an editorial
~. Power, July, 1943, pI.
29. Power, August, 1946
in Power in August 1946, just after the major African mine--;orkers' strike involving about 40 000 workers, the Association once again reiterated the need for the recognition of the elementary right of expression for workers irrespective of colour but while recognising the legitimacy of African worker rights went on to say that:
'such organisation should be wholly African, self-contained and confined to African workers, in the industry concerned. European
participation in such unions should not be permitted. Stated bluntly, the development of such unions should be in the hands of the Natives themselves.'~
The Association did not in practice organise African workers into parallel unions. We can safely assume that this was because the problem did not really affect SAEWA directly and was not threatening their privileges at that time. It only became a problem for them in the 19708 for reasons which will be discussed later. Only in 1978 did SAEWA take a decision to assist Africans in the electrical industry to organise a parallel trade union.
According to Lewis and De clercq31, by 1945, capital had succeeded in undermining craft union controls.
The result was that these unions now employed the usual techniques of craft unions to exclude African workers from particular grades or jobs. It is necessary to quote at length from the Association's journal as this provides evidence that the union was trying to deal with the effects of mechanisation and deskilling, and as De Clercq32 suggests, had to reconstitute itself as a craft-diluted union by organising semi-skilled workers as well.
~. Power, August, 1946.
31. DeClercq F, p20 and Lewis J, 1984, p4.
32. She is here referring not specifically to the Electrical Industry
'old established unions must abandon their
isolationism and become the sheet anchor for the hosts of semi-skilled who are now beginning to dominate the scene; failure to recognise this inevitable development may well leave some of them in the unhappy position of having to look both ways at once - to the right~ where the same exploitative interests will seek to demolish whatever privileges their skill may endow them with: and left, where the dynamism of less fortunate elements will prove an
embarrassment. ,33
'Our association approaches the future on a basis of a skilled nucleus maintaining its status and at the same time extending its protection and guidance·to those fortunate workers who for various reasons, particularly the evolution of the machine, find themselves classed among the semi-skilled or operative workers category.'~
The craft union responded as Lewis suggests by resorting to· the traditional techniques of craft unions. Although the Apprenticeship Act of 1944 (replaced by the Manpower Training Act of 1981) provided no racial criteria for indenturing apprentices , i n practice there were several factors that militated against the indenturing of 'coloured', Asian and African apprentices. In addition, the Black Building Workers Act, 1951, prohibited the employment of Africans as skilled workers in an urban area.35 The most common method used to exclude apprentices who were not white was the 'closed shop' agreement negotiated between the registered union and the employer associations at Industrial Councils. This reserved skilled jobs for registered union members and because Africans could not belong to these unions,
33. Power, December 1942.
~. Power, August 1943.
35. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation,Part 2, Department of Manpower Utilisation, p17.
they were automatically barred from the job as well.
Craft unions representing artisans also used their seats on Apprenticeship Committees to block applications by an employer to indenture an African or , coloured' apprentice. 36 This ensured that Afr icans, particularly, could never become artisans. Non- statutory work reservation, educational requirements for apprentices, and a lack of technical and theoretical training facilities in some areas were other factors which ensured that largely Whites would be indentured as apprentices.37
This strategy of racial exclusion using the Industrial Conciliation machinery was in conflict with the interests of African workers and also contrary to the non-racial tradition of the Trades and Labour Council.
However, it is not enough to isolate these structural problems as the cause of the breakdown of unity in the TLC and to neglect the political and racial issues.
The editorials of Power during this period constantly refer to the increasing domination by the left-wing industrial unions. A SAEWA editorial in 1949, stated 'The artisan unions particularly have been unhappy with the trend of policy being laid down by the majority group within this organisation.'~ Lewis argues that 'the left's victory in 1948 (referring to a motion that was defeated which proposed to exclude African trade unions from the TLC) further polarised politics in the TLC, and as the craft unions developed explicitly racial strategies they became increasingly disposed to adopt right-wing positions on other issues. ,39
36. 'Coloureds' were only allowed to become apprentices in the early 1970's. Before this they were not fonnally apprenticed but became qualified after working in the industry for a certain number of years. They had to write a trade test to qualify.
37. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation, Part 2, Department of Manpower Utilisation, p32
~. Power, April 1949.
39.~J, 1984,pl68.
The craft unions for example supported the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act. SAEWA' s only concern was, '(w)e sincerely hope that this Act is only implemented against genuine Communists, and not used as a weapon to hamper, or even crush legitimate non- Communist Worker's Organisation. ,40
SAEWA finally disaffiliated from the TLC on 30th October, 1950 explaining the decision to its members
in the following way:
'During the post-war years, the section of the Trades Council representing the purely secondary industries has steadily been gaining control of that body. Today, the artisan, or skilled union group is in the minority on the executive of the TLC and the decisions are dictated by
organisations representing the manufacturing
trades. ,41 .
The union was subsequently instrumental in initiating the South African Federation of Trade Unions.
1.2 Response to the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 1956: The Birth of the Electrical and Allied Trades Union of South Africa
In early 1952, the Minister of Labour made a public pronouncement concerning the Government's intention to introduce legislation to segregate 'mixed' unions. 42
The Industrial Conciliation Act43 finally enacted in 1956 provided for the creation of separate trade unions or separate branches of existing unions for white and 'coloured' workers. No further mixed unions
40. Power, July 1950.
41. Power,November 1950.
42. Power, May 1955.
43. Horrel M, 1961, p20.
were to be registered. Existing mixed unions were to be split along racial lines. It allowed that if over half the white and 'coloured' membership in existing unions wished to break away and establish a separate union along racial lines, they could apply for registration. It further allowed splinter unions to obtain a share of the assets of the original mixed union. Any mixed unions which continued to exist had to have separate meetings for their white and 'coloured' workers. The other important provision of the Act was the introduction of job reservation making it possible to reserve specified types of work for persons of a defined racial group.
The Co-ordinating Body representing registered mixed unions (the SAFTU - of which SAEWA was a member, TLC, WPFLU, the Mechanics' Unions' Joint Executives (MUJE) and the Co-Ordinating Council of Furniture Unions) responded by meeting on the 26th March 1953 and issued a statement to the government demanding that:
'there should be no legislative interference with the right of workers in any occupation, to organise in such manner as best suits their economic interests. Experience has shown •••
there can be no adequate safeguards against the lowering of the workers' standards of wages and employment conditions other than the total organisation of the workers concerned
irrespective of race or colour, on the basis of the "rate for the job".,44
Superficially this opposition to the proposed Act might seem to be contrary to the position of SAEWA and the other craft unions who according to our earlier analysis should have been in their 'racial phase.' However, a closer examination reveals that this is perfectly consistent with their earlier position. For the craft-diluted unions which sought to control access to certain skilled and semi-skilled grades it
44. Lewis I, 1984, pl72.
1
was essential to enlist the support of 'coloured' and Asian workers in these grades to prevent undercutting.
In fact the protection of their skill depended on the continued existence of such unions. This was of course best secured by means of 'mixed' unions.~
FUrthermore, because of the inherited tradition of British craft unionism, the craft unions in South Africa resented the interference of the state.46 They felt that official racist legislation was unnecessary and that they could continue to protect their members' interests utilising the mechanism of the 'rate for the job', the Apprenticeship System and the closed shop agreements.
After unsuccessful attempts to prevent the State from enacting the Industrial Conciliation Act, SAEWA was forced to establish the Electrical and Allied Trades Union of South Africa47 comprising the 'coloured' members of the Association. According to Paul Van Oordt, there were only 35 'coloured' members of the Association.48 In the words of Jordaan, the president of the 'coloured' Electrical and Allied Trades Union of South Africa, in 1971, '(w)e are the non-white off-shoot of SAEWA. ,49
It seems that SAEWA, in 1952, in anticipation of the legislation - separated their 'coloured' members by having separate meetings.50 According to Cyril Shield, it was only in 1961 that 'coloured' members of SAEWA registered as· the Coloured Persons of SAEWA51 •
They held elections for the first time in 1961 to
45. Ibid.
46. Telephonic interview with Jeff Lever 2/5/89, Head of the Sociology Department at the University of the Western Cape.
47. See Appendix A for diagrammatical representations of the establishment of the parallel union by SAEWA.
48. Interview 2/5/89 with Paul Van Oordt,the last President of EATUSA before it merged with EAWUSA in 1985.
49. Power, December 1971, p12. .
50. Interview 28/4/89 with Cyril Shield, general secretary of EATUSA since 1968 until he resigned in 1984.
51. Ibid.
elect their own 'coloured' executive. 52 In 1968, the name of the 'coloured' union was changed to the Electrical and Allied Trades Union of South Africa
(EATUSA) •
The 'Unity Committee' , initiated by the craft dominated South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAEWA was an affiliate), the TLC and the Western Province Federation of Labour Unions,53 in 1954 to co-ordinate the campaign against the segregation proposals in the new Industrial Conciliation Bill, developed into the South African Trades Union Council (SATUC) (later TUCSA). According to Harrel, both the Trades and Labour Council and the Western Province Federation of Labour Unions subsequently voted themselves out of existence, advising constituent unions to affiliate to the new SATUC. Almost half of the members of the South African Federation of Trade Unions broke away to join the SATUC - included among these were the South African Typographical Union, the South African Boilermakers Society, the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, the South African Electrical Workers Association (SAEWA) and the Natal and Cape Furniture Worker's Unions.~ The SATUC confined membership to registered unions - thereby excluding African Unions55 .
TUCSA's relationship with African unions amounted yet again to the need to control and subordinate them.
Some industrial unions had decided to organise African workers in parallel unions in the 1950' s. But this was seen as a strategy to break the independent African unions belonging to the Council of Non- European Trade Unions (CNETU), who i t was feared were using CNETU as a political platform from which to challenge the status quo. 56 In 1955 the president of 52. Power, March, 1962, p6.
53. De Clercq, 1980, p30.
~. Honel M, 1961, p22.
55. See Appendix B for SAEWA'S historical affiliation to the different trade union federations.
56. De Clercq P, 1980, p30.
TUCSA outlined what he saw as the tasks of the registered union:
'Trade unions should be willing to guide the Natives along the path of responsible trade unions without endangering their own standards of leadership. Suppression will instil in workers the desire for political power to alleviate their lot. That is a possibility which we cannot contemplate without grave
misgivings i f the European people wish to remain in South Africa. ,57
In 1962, because of pressure from the industrial unions TUCSA decided to allow African union affiliation despite opposition from the government and its affiliated craft-diluted unions. In November 1967, R. Cowley, General secretary of SAEWA at the time, clarified the position of the Association in the midst of increasing tension on the question of African participation in TUCSA. For the first time we have overt racist statements emanating from SAEWA:
'We are up against employers who are turning the many industries with which we are concerned into black industries to the detriment of the white workers. '
'This Association reiterates its policy in regard to the clause in TUCSA's constitution which allows for the affiliation of unregistered Bantu trade unions. Two years ago we tried without success to have the contentious clause eliminated from the constitution and we shall press for it at the conference to be held early in 1968. ,58
The article called together and not organising 'Bantu'
on all white trade unions to stand be divided on the subject of workers maintaining that this was
57. SALB, Vol 3, No 4, January/February 1977.
58. Power, November 1%7, p2, R. Cowley.
vital if they were to prevent industries from becoming blacker than they were. 'We believe further that it.
is at present a sheer waste of time and energy to attempt to organise the 'Bantu'. They are, firstly not interested, and, secondly, thankless.,59
At the TUCSA Conference on 11 December 1967 the continued affiliation of the African Unions was discussed. The conference agreed to recommend to affiliates that membership be restricted to registered unions which would in effect debar African unions once again. However, the meeting agreed that no change could be made to the constitution as this was the prerogative of the ordinary general conference. At the next such conference, in April 1968, the issue was brought up for consideration. The debate, initiated by a resolution from SAEWA, who played a key role in the discussions seeking to debar African affiliation, took up practically the whole day and was conducted in open session. 60 There was, however, a marked change of sentiment in that whereas at the December 1967 meeting most delegates supported the conclusion that TUCSA should be preserved at the cost of the African Unions, the overwhelming feeling now was the opposite.
The exclusion amendment to the constitution was defeated, by 76 votes to 18, with 2 abstentions.61 At the subsequent Ninth Triennial Conference of SAEWA held in early May 1968 the National Executive Council was instructed by branch delegates to disaffiliate from TUCSA immediately. (Between July and september five other major craft unions also withdrew - among them the South African Typographical Union.)
59. Power, November 1%7, p2.
60. Imrie R, 1979, p38.
61. Ibid, p36.
- I
1.3 Response to Wiehahn: Birth of Electrical and Allied Workers Union of South Africa
(EAWUSA)
The 1979 Wiehahn Report introduced a very significant restructuring of labour relations.62 The Wiehahn Report itself was the state's (and capital's) response to the deepening economic and political crisis in the country since the early seventies. The rapid growth of an African urban working class along with the growth of a militant, unregistered trade union movement signified to the state the need to embark on a new strategy if they hoped to restore stability.
Wiehahn introduced the official recognition of trade union rights f o r . Africans, although initially excluding certain sections of the African working class as well as the abolition of job reservation.
until 1979, it had been official government policy that African artisans should receive their training in the homelands and be utilised there after qualification. 63 Africans were thus prohibited from doing skilled work in an urban area unless, 1) they had obtained permission from the Minister, or, 2) they wanted to work in a black residential area, or 3) the building or premises on which they were working was owned by them or was intended for occupation by them and their dependants.64 But the shortage of skilled manpower had reached such critical proportions, retarding economic growth, that Wiehahn was forced to address this problem as well.~
SAEWA and other craft-diluted unions were faced with a situation where Africans were moving into semi-skilled and skilled positions. In addition, acceptance of
62. See Friedman S, 1987, and Macshane D, et aI, 1984, p55.
63. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation, Part 2, Department of Manpower Utilisation, 1980, p32.
64. Ibid. pIS.
~. SALB, Critique of the Wiehahn Commission, 1979, p149.
trade union rights for Africans threatened the protection afforded by the closed shop agreement to Whites and to a lesser extent 'Coloureds' and Asians.
SAEWA, i t seems, was left with few options. More especially because by then they had already lost control over the labour process as a result of the process of deskilling and job fragmentation.M If they wanted to maintain control over job categories by representing everybody in these jobs, they had to consider ways of organising African workers. Cooper argues that the bulk of craft unions welcomed the incorporation of African unions under more effective state control since they were afraid that African unions might be used as a political platform or as a means to undercut their own position in the collective bargaining process. 67 More than ever before the need to implement the 'rate for the job' became imperative.
Only by including African workers in the same bargaining machinery - and this under the firm control of currently registered unions - could this principle be upheld. Furthermore, it was only in this way that the union could prevent the decline in membership which was a feature of most of the existing craft unions.68
SAEWA moved quickly to organise Africans into a parallel union structure. As early as the Association's 12th Triennial Conference in October 1978 a decision was taken 'to take all necessary steps to bring about the formation of a separate union for African electrical workers but that the union should form another section of the umbrella system so successfully operated .•• with our colleagues of the ( 'coloured') EATUSA.' 69 Both the establishment of
M. De Oerq F, p20. She is here referring more generally to the metal and engineering industries.
67. Cooper C, 1983, p35.
68. SALB Memo by FOSATU, 8/11/79.
69. Power, October 1978, p4.
EATUSA in 1956 and EAWUSA in 197870 , though largely a response to legislation enacted by the state, actually anticipated the legislation. The Electrical and Allied Workers Trade Union of South Africa (EAWUSA) was formed in 1978 with Ben Nicholson, who has been General Secretary of SAEWA since 1974, as General Secretary. Ben Nicholson was General Secretary of the 'coloured' EATUSA as well. Because of Nicholson's position as General Secretary of EAWUSA he was able to exert complete control over the African union. Like EATUSA, they enjoyed only nominal independence and in reality were unable to control even their own union subscriptions.
A good indication of the position of EAWUSA with regard to advancing the interests of workers could be gauged by the fact that a German multinational, Siemens based in Pretoria, is said to have actively encouraged the formation of an African union in the electrical industry. 71 This is conceivable as by this time (1978), workers at Siemens already expressed growing frustration and dissatisfaction with the Liaison Committee which had been operating at the factory since 1974.
n
SAEWA and EATUSA alreadyrepresented the white and 'coloured' workers respectively at the company.
This laid the basis for the complete dependence of EAWUSA on its parent, SAEWA, a state of affairs which continued right up until the end of 1985, when the union was party to a merger with the 'coloured' EATUSA.
70. See Appendix C for membership figures for SAEW A, FATUSA, FA WUSA AND FA wruSA for the period 1970 to 1988 .
71. SALB, Memo by FOSATU, 8/11/1979.
n.
Intetview 18/4/89 with Raymond Khoza, the National President of the new merged union- FAWfU.c
H A p T E R2 THE STRUGGLE BEGINS:- THE BIRTH OF
"SPARKY"
The Electrical and Allied Workers Trade Union73 was a national union consisting of over 35 000 members located in the progressive labour movement of which COSATU and NACTU are the main pillars. Within a period of ten years (1977 - 1987) the union has been transformed from a conservative craft union, organised as an exclusively 'coloured' parallel union, into a union based on the principles of non-racialism and working class leadership.
The union's standing was the result of a strong interaction of socio~political developments in the period combined with certain significant isolated events which sparked and ignited a progressive struggle of transformation. In addition, the role of leadership, as manifested in the activities of the core group cannot be underestimated. This leadership originated and developed in a period of political upheaval and turmoil starting in the early 1970s.
The early 1970s marked the be~inning of a deep crisis in the South African economy. 4 This crisis in turn gave rise to a wave of militancy, especially from 1973 onwards, as the black working class (including skilled workers), reeled under the effects of high prices, and increasing unemployment. This new wave of militancy marked the first rise of the black working class after the prolonged period of defeat that followed the banning of the African National Congress and Pan AfricanistCongress in the early 1960s.~ These
73. 'Sparky" is the name of the newsletter of the Western Cape branch of EA roSA and selVes as the mouthpiece of the core group.
74. Gelb S., 1988, pI 75. Gerhart G.M, 1978, p12
repressive measures, together with the bannings and arrest of the South African Congress of Trade Union's leadership and state legislation such as the Sabotage Act of 196276, laid the basis for undisturbed capitalist development in South Africa. This period of economic boom came to an end with the world-wide stock market crash of 1969, the effects of which were felt in South Africa towards the end of 1971. 77 For the working class as a whole this meant the start of declining living standards. Gelb~ gives some statistics which indicate the extent of the economic crisis in South Africa. Since 1974 the inflation rate in South Africa, as measured by the consumer price index, has consistently remained over 10%. In addition, over 200 000 manufacturing workers lost their jobs between 1981 and 1985 - and over 300 000 people came onto the labour market for each of these years. Between 1946 and 1974 South Africa's gross domestic product grew at an annual rate of 4,9% per annum. Between 1974 and 1978, the growth rate dropped to only 1,9% per annum and in the period between 1982 and 1987, it dropped to only 0,6% per annum.
The first major response of the working class was the massive wave of strikes in Natal in 1973 involving over 100 000 black workers.~ Flowing from this series of strikes arose what came to be referred to as the 'independent' unions.M By 1973, the formation of the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) and the National Union of Textiles Workers (NUTW) had been accomplished, followed by the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) in 1974. By 1974, these four unions alone had signed up over 10 000 workers. 81 76. Lacom publication, 1988, p137 (Sabotage Act - even strikes could be sabotage)
77. Gelb S. & Innes D, 1985, p35
~. Gelb S, 1988, pl.
~. Cobbett W & Cohen R, 1988, p22
M. This definition is used by Maree, 1. The term independent refers to the union's strenuous efforts to be free from control by outside parties, particularly the state and management, in order to determine their own form of organisation policies and strategies.
81. Lacom, pISS
This growth of new black trade unions spread rapidly all round the country. While the CWIU and MAWU emerged in Durban, organisations like the Western Province Workers' Advice Bureau - the forerunner of the General Workers Union (GWU) - was established.
Although the rapid growth of the independent trade unions had diverse political origins, for our purposes, i t is enough to mention the various wages commissions set up by the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) in the early 1970s, the Black Consciousness-orientated Urban Training Project (UTP) and the Trade Union Advisory Consultative Committee
(TUACC) .82 These independent unions were characterised by their rapid growth, militancy and growing sophistication in terms of factory floor structures such as strong shop stewards' committees and the negotiation of far-reaching· recognition agreements.
Despite their varied political origins, the new independent unions all had certain characteristics in common. To a lesser or greater extent, they all stressed the need for democratic trade unions, with full worker participation in all aspects of the organisation's development - captured by the slogan 'worker democracy' and a strong commitment to building strong factory-floor shop steward structures.83 These two characteristics, 'worker democracy' and the great emphasis on shop steward structures marked a major watershed for the South African black working class.
Tied to the idea of shop steward structu~es was the question of the role of the working class itself.
These structures provided the organisational form and practice through which the class could challenge the bourgeoisie directly, thereby being able to develop confidence in itself, and developing conciousness of itself as a class. Furthermore, participation in these committees added to the process whereby the
82. FriedmanS, 1987, p37-6S _ 83. Ibid, p59
working class working class political and class. 84
could begin to develop a layer of leaders, committed primarily to the economic interest of the working But the 1970s did not only mark the rise of the black masses in the form of the new unions, but also their involvement
particularly uprisings of
in political struggles generally, the broader based community and student 1976, 1980, and the 1984 - 1986 period.~
Both the South African state and bourgeoisie were eventually forced to take into account the changing economic and political realities and rethink their strategies. The result initially was the Wiehahn recommendations, accepted by the state in 1979, which attempted to incorporate black worker demands into the industrial relations system.86 While the state had a degree of success, it also seriously undermined its own reform programme.87 In fact, it led to growth and consolidation as the independent unions learned to use the system, culminating in the formation of numerous trade union federations as the working class sought further unity. The formation of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in 1979, was followed by the launching of the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) in September 1980 in Johannesburg. M Further consolidation took place with the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in November 1985 and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) in October 1986.89
84. Ibid, pl8S-186.
~. Cobbett W. & Cohen R 19M 86. E. Webster, SA Review 4, 1987, p215 87. Ibid
M. Lacom, p169 and pl77 89. Lacom, p214-215
It is clear, .then, that in the decade since 1973 the fabric of South African life had changed dramatically.
An anecdote in Friedman's book captures this change in power. relations very well.
'The Chairman had had enough. He was, he.
insisted, tired of the almost daily disruption in his factory. Every day seemed to throw up new worker demands and, each time there was a minor problem, the workers struck. It was time
they learned some discipline - it hadn't been like this in the old days ••• He had called the chief shop steward to his office, the chairman warned, because he was the leader of the trade union in the plant. He was responsible for the turmoil and must control his men. The steward listened for a while. Then he leaned slowly across the desk, "What you don't understand, he said quietly, is that I have more power in this factory than you do".'9O
2.1 The Effects of this Period on EA TUSA
The contradictions of the political and economic developments of this period were (among others) manifested in the development of EATUSA. It was in this milieu that, with the conscious intervention of a few workers acting as a core group, the struggle to transform the Electrical and Allied Trades Union into a progressive force within the labour movement took place.
For years, prior to 1976/1977, 'coloured' workers in the electrical industry were virtually defenceless victims of employers, despite being members of a trade union (EATUSA). It was one of many incidents of victimisation, related in one interview with Brian Williams91 which sparked off a conscious and consistent attempt to address malpractices in the
90. Friedman S, 1987, pI
91. Interview Brian Williams 20/4/89
union initially, and subsequently led to its complete transformation.
In 1977 Brian Williams worked as an apprentice electrician on a housing site in Atlantis. 92 After a meeting called by workers on the site to discuss grievances about working conditions, he was accused by management of being an agitator, of instigating unrest and his apprenticeship contract was cancelled by the Apprenticeship Committee.93 At that stage he was completely unaware that he was in fact a member of the Electrical and Allied Trades Union. Acting on the advice of a co-worker, he approached the union seeking assistance with respect to victimisation. The General Secretary of the Union very reluctantly took up his case and eventually referred him to the the Coloured Affairs Department. Brian Williams later discovered that the General Secretary, who was the union representative on the Apprenticeship Committee, did not in fact support his case. However, Brian Williams successfully appealed to the Apprenticeship Committee against their decision.
It was this incident which signalled the start of the long arduous struggle to rid EAT USA of its conservative leadership. Brian Williams rallied a few sympathetic apprentices around this issue and formed, what we will refer to as the core group - a group consisting of five people which was responsible for co-ordinating and spear-heading the attack on the union bureaucracy. Williams explains this:
'cecil~ worked for the same company .•• so with the crisis in the union, one of the first things I did was to speak to the people that I know - to try and get them involved to se that this (here he is referring to the fact that no 92. Interview Brian Williams 30/3/89
93. Both Management and Union representatives in the Industry constitute this committee. The primary function being the regulation and control of Apprenticeships in the Industry.
~. Cecil Theys. an official of FA wruSA was one of the first people that Brian approached.
protection for workers existed) is what is happening. ,95 .
At first this resistance was born of a desire to find out what was happening in their union, an organisation which deducted subscriptions from their wages every week but one which was unable to satisfy the workers' ....,...most basic needs. But, as they encountered more problems in the union's structure and operation, this initial resistance developed into a conscious strategy t~ c~eplace the conservative leadership. As we will attempt to show, a combination of different tactics and methods, and quite often just plain manoeuvring, was used in the battle. Important decisions taken at strategic points served not only to ensure victory, but laid the basis for the democratic foundation of the union later. At the same time, the< conservative white leadership, under pressure from the threat posed by the increasing radicalisation of the core group, responded by resorting to more bureaucratic and dictatorial methods in an attempt to retain control of the union':
EATUSA prior to the transformation, operated along traditional parallel lines enjoying nominal independence, but in reality being controlled by the White General secretary of SAEWA who, as we mentioned before, was General Secretary of EATUSA as well. More immediate control in Cape Town was exerted by a paid White official, Cyril Shield, who acted as General secretary for the Western Cape from the date of registration in 1967 to 1984 when he resigned.96 The core group was thus faced with a conservative, un
